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15 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
16 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

17 LOREAN BARRERA, On Behalf of
18 Herself and All Others Similarly Situated,

19 Plaintiff,

20 v.

21 PHARMAVITE LLC, a California
22 limited liability company,

23 Defendant.

Case No.: 2:11-cv-04153-CAS
(AGrx)

**PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF UNOPPOSED
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT**

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1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff Lorean Barrera, by her counsel Bonnett,
2 Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C. and Siprut, PC, respectfully submit the following
3 Memorandum in Support of her Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of
4 Settlement and moves for an Order: (1) preliminarily approving the Settlement
5 Agreement as being fair, reasonable, and adequate; (2) approving the notice plan
6 (“Notice Plan”) as set forth in the Declaration of Daniel Rosenthal (“Rosenthal
7 Decl.”) (Exhibit F to the Settlement Agreement hereto); (3) setting the date and time
8 of the Fairness Hearing; (4) provisionally certifying the Settlement Class under Rule
9 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for settlement purposes only; (5)
10 provisionally appointing Plaintiff as representative of the Settlement Class; and (6)
11 provisionally appointing Elaine A. Ryan (Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint,
12 P.C.) and Stewart M. Weltman (Siprut, PC)¹ as “Lead Settlement Class Counsel,” and
13 Boodell & Domanskis, LLC, Levin Sedran & Berman and Westerman Law Corp. as
14 “Settlement Class Counsel.”²

15 **I. INTRODUCTION**

16 With substantial assistance and direction from Magistrate Judge Jay S. Gandhi,
17 Plaintiff and Defendant Pharmavite LLC (collectively, the “Parties”) have entered into
18 a Settlement Agreement in the above-referenced matter. (*See* Declaration of Patricia
19 N. Syverson, Exhibit 1). Although both sides believe their respective positions in the
20 action are meritorious, Plaintiff has concluded that, due to the uncertainties and
21 expense of protracted litigation, it is in the best interest of Plaintiff, and the best
22

23 _____
24 ¹ Effective February 1, 2017 Stewart M. Weltman became Of Counsel to the law firm
25 of Siprut, PC, 17 N. State Street, Suite 1600, Chicago, IL 60602.

26 ² Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to
27 them in the Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1 hereto). To the extent there is any
28 conflict between the definitions of those terms, the definitions in the Settlement
Agreement will control.

1 interests of the putative Settlement Class, to resolve this action on the terms provided
2 in the Settlement Agreement.

3 **II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

4 Pharmavite manufactures, markets, sells, and distributes glucosamine and/or
5 chondroitin formulated products sold under the “Nature Made®” brand name, as well
6 as under various brand names of unaffiliated retailers.³ On May 13, 2011, Plaintiff
7 filed this putative class action alleging that certain claims made on the Nature Made
8 TripleFlex products are false, deceptive, and/or misleading. These claims were
9 brought under California consumer protection laws. Plaintiff did not allege that any of
10 the Covered Products were unsafe or presented a safety hazard to consumers. On
11 October 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint on behalf
12 of a nationwide – or California only class. On November 19, 2014, this Court
13 granted, in part, Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification, certifying California-only
14 consumer classes seeking monetary damages. Over the course of the next two years,
15 the Parties completed document and expert discovery, filed and respectively defeated
16 competing summary judgment motions and motions to strike each other’s experts,
17 Plaintiff defeated motions for judicial estoppel and to decertify the Classes, and both
18 Parties had begun preparing the case for trial, providing a fulsome record upon which
19 to base their settlement negotiations.

20 The Settlement Agreement was reached after ten months of vigorous arms’-
21 length negotiations, including an in-person meeting of Plaintiff’s and Pharmavite’s
22 counsel on June 25, 2016, followed by an all-day mediation on July 26, 2016 before a
23 neutral mediator, the Honorable Jay C. Gandhi, Magistrate Judge, and numerous
24 subsequent telephone calls, texts, and email exchanges involving Judge Gandhi and
25 the Parties’ counsel.

26
27 ³ A complete list of the products covered by the Settlement Agreement (the “Covered
28 Products”) is attached as Syverson Decl., Ex. 1-B.

1 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

2 The proposed settlement provides the following:

3 **A. Certification of the Proposed Settlement Class**

4 Plaintiff requests that the Court, for the purposes of settlement only, certify a
5 Settlement Class defined as:

6 All residents of the United States who purchased for personal use,
7 and not resale or distribution, a Covered Product between May 1,
8 2007 and the Preliminary Approval Date (the “Class Period”).

9 Specifically excluded from the Settlement Class are the following
10 Persons:

- 11 i. Pharmavite and its respective affiliates, employees,
12 officers, directors, agents, and representatives, and their
immediate family members;
- 13 ii. Settlement Class Counsel and partners, attorneys, and
14 employees of their law firms; and
- 15 iii. The judges who have presided over the Litigation or
16 mediated the settlement and their immediate family
members.

17 **B. Class Relief**

18 1. **Monetary Relief - Cash Paid To Settlement Class Members**

19 Each Settlement Class Member shall be entitled to seek a monetary benefit or
20 free Offered Product Benefits. Pharmavite shall pay \$1 million to be distributed to
21 Settlement Class Members with valid claims who elect cash compensation.
22 Settlement Class Members who have Adequate Proof of Purchase (*e.g.*, receipts,
23 boxes or bottles, credit card statements, or similar documentation that identifies the
24 Covered Product) for purchases made during the Class Period may request \$25 for
25 each Covered Product purchased during the Class Period, up to four (4) Covered
26 Products or \$100, per household. Settlement Class Members who elect cash
27 compensation but do not have adequate proof of purchase may request \$12.50 for each
28 Covered Product purchased during the Class Period, up to a maximum of four (4)

1 Products or \$50, per household. Each Class Member seeking monetary compensation
2 must submit a Claim Form which will require a sworn declaration but no notarization.
3 Any excess cash which is not used to pay validated cash claims will be distributed
4 with *pro rata* increases to all claimants with validated cash claims until all cash is
5 distributed. Any shortfall will result in *pro rata* reductions of all validated cash
6 claims. If there is insufficient cash to fulfill all valid claims, such claimants can
7 receive Offered Product Benefits, as described below.

8 **2. Free Offered Product Benefits to Settlement Class**
9 **Members**

10 Pharmavite shall provide Settlement Class Members with \$5.9 million in
11 product and fulfillment costs (“Offered Product Benefits”) (based on Pharmavite’s
12 MSRP and actual fulfillment costs) to be distributed to Settlement Class Members
13 with valid claims who do not make a cash claim and/or whose cash claim is not
14 wholly fulfilled from available funds. Settlement Class Members, regardless of
15 whether they possess adequate proof of purchase, may request up to \$25 worth of
16 Offered Product Benefits for each Covered Product they purchased during the Class
17 Period, up to a maximum of six (6) Covered Products or \$150 worth of Offered
18 Product Benefits, per household. The Offered Product Benefits include the following
19 current Pharmavite products: (1) Balanced B-100 Timed Release; (2) Super B
20 Complex, Mega Size; (3) Multi Complete Value Size; (4) Multi Prenatal Value Size;
21 (5) Prenatal + DHA; (6) Prenatal + DHA Value Size; (7) Postnatal Multi + DHA; (8)
22 Fish Oil 1200 mg. Burp-less Value Size; (9) Krill Oil 300 mg; (10) Triple Omega 3-6-
23 9 Value Size; (11) Digestive Probiotics Daily Balance; (12) TripleFlex® Triple
24 Strength Value Size; (13) TripleFlex® Triple Strength 50+ Value Size; (14)
25 CholestOff® Plus; (15) Multi Adult Gummies; (16) Triple Omega 3-6-9; and (17)
26 Super Omega-3 Fish Oil Full Strength Mini. (*See Ex. 1-D.*) Any excess Offered
27 Product Benefits which is not needed to fulfill validated claims will be distributed
28 with *pro rata* increases to claimants (whether requesting solely Offered Product

1 Benefits or a Cash Award reduced *pro rata*) with validated claims up to \$300 of
2 Offered Product Benefits.

3 If excess product remains after all validated claims and *pro rata* increases up to
4 \$300 per household of Offered Product Benefits have been fulfilled, any remaining
5 product shall be donated to the following *cy pres* charity: Feed The Children,
6 <http://www.feedthechildren.org/>. This *cy pres* charity recipient is a nationwide
7 organization which implements programs for children and adults throughout the
8 country, including, among others, food programs and education programs regarding
9 general health, consumption of vitamins/minerals and proper utilization of dietary
10 supplements – all of which have a significant bearing on the issues involved in this
11 case. Further, Pharmavite represents that any *cy pres* distribution pursuant to the
12 terms of the Settlement Agreement will not be taken as a charitable contribution for
13 tax purposes, will not be used to fulfill previously budgeted charitable giving, and that
14 Feed the Children is not a charity to which Pharmavite is currently obligated to
15 donate. (*See* Ex. 1-E.) Any shortfall in Offered Product Benefits will result in *pro*
16 *rata* reductions of validated claims.

17 **3. Injunctive Relief - Labeling Changes**

18 Beginning 180 days after the Effective Date, Pharmavite will not use the
19 following terms, or any substantially identical variation of the proscribed terms, on
20 product labels to describe the effect of glucosamine and/or chondroitin on cartilage:
21 “rebuild”, “rebuilds”, “rebuilding”, “renew”, “renewing”, “renewal”, “rejuvenate”,
22 “rejuvenates”, “rejuvenation”, or “rejuvenating”.

23 Pharmavite may petition this Court to dissolve this injunctive relief and allow
24 Pharmavite to make some or all of the statements identified above if, subsequent to
25 the Effective Date, Pharmavite possesses and relies upon an independent, well-
26 conducted, published clinical trial that substantiates the statements.

27
28

1 **C. Incentive Award to Class Representative**

2 The Settlement Agreement provides that Plaintiff will apply for an Incentive
3 Award of up to \$10,000 as compensation for bringing this action, serving as the Court
4 appointed class representative, providing documents and deposition testimony,
5 actively monitoring and assisting Plaintiff’s counsel to ready this action for trial and
6 participating in person in an all-day mediation ultimately resulting in the resolution of
7 this case. Pharmavite agrees not to object to Plaintiff’s application for such Incentive
8 Award and to pay any Incentive Award (not to exceed \$10,000) that is awarded by the
9 Court. The payment of this Incentive Award will be separate and apart from, and will
10 not diminish or erode, the payment of claims to Settlement Class Members as set forth
11 above.

12 **D. Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses**

13 The Settlement Agreement provides that Pharmavite will not object to the Court
14 awarding the firms of Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C., Siprut, PC,
15 Boodell & Domanskis, LLC, Levin Sedran & Berman, and Westerman Law Corp. up
16 to \$600,000 in cost reimbursements and an aggregate fee award of up to \$3.475
17 million. Up to those amounts, respectively, as ordered by the Court, Pharmavite will
18 pay attorneys’ fees and expenses separate and apart from, and will not diminish or
19 erode, the payment of claims to Settlement Class Members as set forth above.

20 ///

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1 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE PROVISIONALLY**
2 **CERTIFIED; THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY**
3 **APPROVED; THE FORM AND METHOD OF NOTICE TO THE**
4 **CLASS MEMBERS SHOULD BE APPROVED; AND A HEARING**
5 **REGARDING FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD**
6 **BE SCHEDULED⁴**

7 The Ninth Circuit recognizes the propriety of certifying a settlement Class to
8 resolve consumer lawsuits. *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.
9 1998). When presented with a proposed settlement, a court must first determine
10 whether the proposed settlement class satisfies the requirements for class certification
11 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. *Id.* However, where a court is evaluating
12 the certification question in the context of a proposed settlement class, questions
13 regarding the manageability of the case for trial purposes are not considered. *Wright*
14 *v. Linkus Enterps., Inc.*, 259 F.R.D. 468, 474 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing *Amchem Prods.,*
15 *Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“Confronted with a request for settlement-
16 only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried,
17 would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be
18 no trial.”)). Here, the provisional certification of the Settlement Class is appropriate
19 for purposes of settlement because all the requirements of Rule 23 have been met.

20 ⁴ It is Pharmavite’s position, as it has informed Settlement Class Counsel (and
21 Settlement Class Counsel hereby so informs the Court), that Pharmavite still maintains
22 its positions as set forth in the parties’ vigorously litigated class certification motion
23 practice. *See, e.g.*, Docs. D.E. 82 (Pltf’s class cert motion); D.E. 123 (Def’s
24 opposition); D.E. 136 (Pltf’s reply); D.E. 149 (Def’s objections to expert rebuttal
25 report of TJS filed with Plaintiff’s reply); D.E. 171 (Def’s notice of supplemental
26 authority in opposition to class cert motion); D.E. 172 (Def’s request for judicial
27 notice in support of opposition to class cert motion); D.E. 173 (Pl’s response to Def’s
28 notice of supplemental authority); D.E. 174 (Pl’s objections to request for judicial
notice); D.E. 181 (Def’s application to file supplemental declaration of Poswillo in
support of opp to class cert). However, with that reservation, and because Pharmavite
recognizes that certifying a class in a non-settlement context differs from doing so in a
settlement context, Pharmavite will not burden the record by recapitulating its prior
submissions on class certification in a non-settlement context. Plaintiff maintains that
the Court properly certified the Classes.

1 **A. The Settlement Class Satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)**

2 Rule 23(a) enumerates four prerequisites for class certification, referred to as:
3 (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy. In light of the
4 settlement, each of these requirements is met for the Settlement Class.

5 **1. Numerosity**

6 Rule 23(a)(1) requires that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
7 is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); *Wiener v. Dannon Co., Inc.*, 255 F.R.D. 658,
8 664 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Pharmavite is a nationwide manufacturer of the Covered
9 Products and has sold an estimated 14.8 million of these products nationwide during
10 the Class Period. (D.E. 241-3 (Expert Report of Joseph J. Gardemal III), at ¶ 25.)
11 Accordingly, the numerosity requirement is readily met because it is difficult or
12 inconvenient to join all members of the proposed Settlement Class. *See Reynoso v. S.*
13 *County Concepts*, No. 07-373, 2007 WL 4592119, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2007)
14 (“The sheer number of potential class members justifies the Court’s finding that the
15 class in this case meets the numerosity requirement.”); *Wiener*, 255 F.R.D. at 664;
16 *Tchoboian v. Parking Concepts, Inc.*, No. SACV 09-422, 2009 WL 2169883, at *4
17 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2009) (citing *Jordan v. Los Angeles County*, 669 F.2d 1311, 1319
18 (9th Cir. 1982), *vacated on other grounds*, 459 U.S. 810 (1982)).

19 **2. Commonality**

20 “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have
21 suffered the same injury . . . Their claims must depend upon a common contention . . .
22 That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of
23 class-wide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will
24 resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”
25 *Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). Still, “[t]he existence of
26 shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient [to satisfy
27 commonality], as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal
28 remedies within the class.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1019; *In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.*,

1 471 F.3d 977, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2006). The commonality requirement is construed
2 “permissively.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1019; *Wiener*, 255 F.R.D. at 664.

3 This prerequisite is readily met with respect to the Settlement Class. To quote
4 *Wiener*: “The proposed class members clearly share common legal issues regarding
5 [Defendant’s] alleged deception and misrepresentations in its advertising and
6 promotion of the Products.” 255 F.R.D. at 664-65; *see also Johnson v. General Mills,*
7 *Inc.*, 275 F.R.D. 282, 287 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (plaintiff’s claims presented common, core
8 issues of law and fact, including “whether General Mills communicated a
9 representation [] that YoPlus promoted digestive health” and “whether YoPlus does
10 confer a digestive health benefit that ordinary yogurt does not”); *Fine v. ConAgra*
11 *Foods, Inc.*, NO. 10-01848, 2010 WL 3632469 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010)
12 (“Since Plaintiff’s claims and the proposed class are based on the same misleading
13 label on the boxes of popcorn, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently
14 demonstrated commonality pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2).”). Here, as well, the core issue
15 for each Settlement Class Member’s claim is whether the Covered Products provide
16 the benefits stated on the labeling. D.E. 32, Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 25-45;
17 *see also* Syverson Decl., Ex. 2 (exemplar collection of Product labeling); D.E. Nos.
18 249-65, 249-66, 249-67, 249-68 (Label Exemplars); Syverson Decl., Ex. 3, Report of
19 Thomas J. Schnitzer MD, PhD.

20 The common factual and legal issues include:

- 21 • Whether the statements that Pharmavite made on the labels of the
22 Covered Products were or are misleading, or likely to deceive;
- 23 • Whether Plaintiff and the Settlement Class were deceived in some
24 manner by Pharmavite’s label statements;
- 25 • Whether the alleged conduct constitutes violations of the laws
26 asserted herein;
- 27 • Whether Plaintiff and Settlement Class have been injured and the
28 proper measure of their losses as a result of those injuries;

- 1 • Whether Plaintiff and Settlement Class are entitled to an award of
- 2 compensatory/actual damages; and
- 3 • Whether Plaintiff and the Settlement Class are entitled to any other
- 4 form of relief.

5 Thus, the determination of the truth, or falsity, or capability to mislead or

6 deceive of Pharmavite’s labeling statements will resolve this central issue in one

7 stroke. Accordingly, the commonality requirement is satisfied.

8 3. **Typicality**

9 Rule 23(a)(3) typicality is satisfied where the plaintiff’s claims are “reasonably

10 co-extensive” with absent class members’ claims; they need not be “substantially

11 identical.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020; *see also Wiener*, 255 F.R.D. at 665. The test

12 for typicality “is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the

13 action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named Plaintiffs, and whether

14 other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” *Hanon v.*

15 *Dataproducts Corp.*, 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, “[t]he purpose of the

16 typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns

17 with the interests of the class.” *Id.* For example, in *Johns v. Bayer Corp.*, 280 F.R.D.

18 551 (S.D. Cal. 2012), in certifying UCL and CLRA claims the court found the

19 typicality requirement was satisfied because: “Plaintiffs and class members thus were

20 all exposed to the same alleged misrepresentations on the packages and

21 advertisements.” *Id.* at 557.

22 Typicality is met here as Plaintiff and the proposed Settlement Class assert the

23 same claims, arising from the same course of conduct – Pharmavite’s allegedly false

24 and deceptive Covered Product labels. Plaintiff alleges that the labeling of the

25 Covered Products all misrepresented the products’ benefits. Plaintiff further alleges

26 that she and all members of the Settlement Class were injured when they paid money

27 to purchase the Covered Products. *See, e.g., Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct.*, 51 Cal. 4th

28 310, 344 (2011) (“[I]n the eyes of the law, a buyer forced to pay more than he or she

1 would have is harmed at the moment of purchase, and further inquiry into such
2 subsequent transactions, actual or hypothesized, ordinarily is unnecessary.”).⁵
3 Plaintiff and the Settlement Class also seek the same relief for the same alleged
4 wrongful conduct, *i.e.*, misrepresenting the effectiveness of the Covered Products.
5 Since Plaintiff and the Settlement Class’ claims arise from the same alleged
6 misrepresentations that purportedly injured them all alike, typicality is satisfied.
7 *Johns v. Bayer Corp.*, 280 F.R.D. at 557; *see also Weeks v. Kellogg Co.*, No. 09-
8 08102, 2013 WL 6531177, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2013) (case involved false and
9 misleading statements on cereal packages wherein the court held “the named
10 plaintiffs, like all class members, contend they were injured by defendants’ false and
11 misleading immunity claims. Consequently, the typicality requirement is met.”).

12 4. Adequacy of Representation

13 Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately
14 protect the interests of the class.” In the Ninth Circuit, adequacy is satisfied where: (i)
15 counsel for the class is qualified and competent to vigorously prosecute the action, and
16 (ii) the interests of the proposed class representatives are not antagonistic to the
17 interests of the class. *See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing*, 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003);
18 *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020; *Molski v. Gleich*, 318 F.3d 937, 955 (9th Cir. 2003),
19 *overruled on other grounds in Dukes v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc.*, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.
20 2010); *Wiener*, 255 F.R.D. at 667.

21 The adequacy requirement is met here with respect to the Settlement Class.
22 First, the interests of Plaintiff and members of the Settlement Class are fully aligned
23 and conflict free: Plaintiff and members of the Settlement Class are seeking redress
24 from what is essentially the same alleged injury and there are no disabling conflicts of
25

26 ⁵ *Accord Johns v. Bayer Corp.*, 280 F.R.D. 551, 557 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“[This
27 litigation] is about point-of-purchase loss. Plaintiffs and class members were allegedly
28 injured when they paid money to purchase the Men’s Vitamins.”); *Guido v. L’Oreal,
USA, Inc.*, 284 F.R.D. 468, 482 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (same).

1 interest. Second, Class Counsel for the Settlement Class are qualified and experienced
2 in class action litigation, and meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). *See*
3 Syverson Decl., Ex. 4 (firm resumes). Through qualified Class Counsel, Plaintiff has
4 performed extensive work to date in identifying and investigating potential claims in
5 this action, establishing the factual basis for the claims sufficient to prepare a detailed
6 class action complaint, pursuing and reviewing document discovery, engaging and
7 submitting expert reports, engaging in extensive motion practice, obtaining
8 certification of California Classes, defeating Pharmavite’s summary judgment
9 motion, motion to decertify, and *Daubert* motions, and in successfully mediating and
10 negotiating the proposed settlement. *See In re Emulex Corp.*, 210 F.R.D. 717, 720
11 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (court evaluating adequacy of counsel’s representation may examine
12 “the attorneys’ professional qualifications, skill, experience, and resources . . . [and]
13 the attorneys’ demonstrated performance in the suit itself”).

14 **B. The Settlement Class Should Be Provisionally Certified Under**
15 **Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)**

16 Plaintiff seeks certification of a Settlement Class under Rule 23(b)(3).
17 Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate “whenever the actual interests of the
18 parties can be served best by settling their difference in a single action.” *Hanlon*, 150
19 F.3d at 1022 (*quoting* 7A C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller, & M. Kane, *Federal Practice &*
20 *Procedure* §1777 (2d ed. 1986)). There are two fundamental conditions to
21 certification under Rule 23(b)(3): (1) questions of law or fact common to the members
22 of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and
23 (2) a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
24 adjudication of the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); *Local Joint Exec. Bd. of*
25 *Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc.*, 244 F.3d 1152, 1162-63 (9th
26 Cir. 2001); *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1022; *Wiener*, 255 F.R.D. at 668. As such, Rule
27 23(b)(3) encompasses those cases “in which a class action would achieve economies
28 of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons

1 similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other
2 undesirable results.” *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 615; *Wiener*, 255 F.R.D. at 668.

3 **1. Common Questions Predominate Over Individual Issues**

4 The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry “tests whether proposed classes are
5 sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at
6 623; *Hartless v. Clorox Co.*, 273 F.R.D. 630, 638 (S.D. Cal. 2011). “Predominance is
7 a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer . . . fraud” *Amchem*, 521
8 U.S. at 623. “When common questions present a significant aspect of the case and
9 they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication, there is clear
10 justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual
11 basis.” *Fed. Prac. & Proc.*, §1778; *Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon*, 457 U.S.
12 147, 158 n.13 (1982) (noting that commonality and typicality tend to merge).

13 The predominance requirement is satisfied here with respect to the Settlement
14 Class. As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges that the Settlement Class is entitled to the
15 same legal remedies premised on the same alleged wrongdoing. Plaintiff alleges that
16 all of the packaging conveys the same message regarding the benefits of the Covered
17 Products. *See Ex. 2* (exemplars of the Covered Products’ labeling). Thus, the central
18 issues for every Person in the Settlement Class are whether Pharmavite’s claims that
19 the Covered Products provided the benefits stated on the labels were false or deceptive
20 and whether Pharmavite’s alleged misrepresentations regarding the Covered Products
21 was likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. *See Johns*, 280 F.R.D. at 557 (“the
22 predominating common issues include whether Bayer misrepresented that the Men’s
23 Vitamins ‘support prostate health’ and whether the misrepresentations were likely to
24 deceive a reasonable consumer”). With respect to the Settlement Class, these issues
25 predominate and are together the “heart of the litigation” because they would be
26 decided in every trial brought by individual members of the Settlement Class and can
27 be proven or disproven with the same class-wide evidence.

1 Under these circumstances, predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied with
2 respect to the Settlement Class. *Hartless*, 273 F.R.D. at 638-39 (predominance
3 established where all class members were exposed to the same alleged
4 misrepresentations); *Wiener*, 255 F.R.D. at 669 (predominance satisfied when alleged
5 misrepresentation of product’s health benefits were displayed on every package).⁶
6 Indeed, over Pharmavite’s opposition, the Court already determined that common
7 issues predominated in certifying the California classes. (D.E. 192 (Order re Motion
8 to Certify Class), at 28-29) (“The Court finds that common questions predominate
9 with regard to the California-only classes. ... [W]hether Pharmavite misrepresented
10 that TripleFlex improves joint ‘comfort, mobility, and flexibility’ will be determined
11 through the presentation of expert, scientific testimony. ... Second ... common
12 questions will predominate regarding whether these misrepresentations are likely to
13 deceive a reasonable consumer. ... Similarly, common issues predominate regarding
14 reliance and causation because none of the California consumer protection statutes
15 requires individualized proof of these elements.”)

16 **2. A Class Action Is The Superior Method to Settle This**
17 **Controversy**

18 Rule 23(b)(3) sets forth the relevant factors for determining whether a class
19 action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
20 the controversy. These factors include: (i) the interest of members of the Settlement
21 Class in individually controlling separate actions; (ii) the extent and nature of any
22 litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against members of the
23 Settlement Class; (iii) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation

24 _____
25 ⁶ See also, e.g., *In re POM Wonderful LLC Mktg. and Sales Practices*, No. ML 10-
26 02199, 2012 WL 4490860, *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012) (certifying labeling claims);
27 *Johns*, 280 F.R.D. 551 (same); *In re Ferrero*, 278 F.R.D. 552, 556 (S.D. Cal. 2011)
28 (same); *Johnson v. General Mills, Inc.*, 276 F.R.D. 519, 521 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (same);
Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. C 10-01192, 2011 WL 2221113, *1 (N.D. Cal.
June 7, 2011) (same); *Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co.*, 268 F.R.D. 365, 380
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (same).

1 of the claims in the particular forum; and (iv) the likely difficulties in managing a
2 class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); *see Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc.*, 253
3 F.3d 1180, 1190-92 (9th Cir. 2001). “[C]onsideration of these factors requires the
4 court to focus on the efficiency and economy elements of the class action so that cases
5 allowed under subdivision (b)(3) are those that can be adjudicated most profitably on
6 a representative basis.” *Zinser*, 253 F.3d at 1190 (citations omitted); *see also*
7 *Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.*, 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding the
8 superiority requirement satisfied where granting class certification “will reduce
9 litigation costs and promote greater efficiency”).

10 Application of the Rule 23(b)(3) “superiority” factors show that a class action is
11 the preferred procedure for this settlement. The damages at issue for each member of
12 the Settlement Class are not large. *Zinser*, 253 F.3d at 1191; *Wiener* 255 F.R.D. at
13 671. It is neither economically feasible, nor judicially efficient, for members of the
14 settlement Class to pursue their claims against Pharmavite on an individual basis.
15 *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1023; *Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper*, 445 U.S. 326, 338-
16 39 (1980); *Vasquez v. Super. Ct.*, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808 (1971); *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 617
17 (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
18 problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring
19 a solo action prosecuting his or her rights”). Additionally, the fact of settlement
20 eliminates any potential difficulties in managing the trial of this action as a class
21 action. *See Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 620 (when “confronted with a request for
22 settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if
23 tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that
24 there be no trial”). As such, under the circumstances presented here, a class action is
25 clearly superior to any other mechanism for adjudicating the claims of the Settlement
26 Class. The requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied with respect to the Settlement
27 Class.

1 **C. Plaintiff Should Be Appointed Settlement Class Representative And**
2 **Class Counsel Should Be Appointed For The Settlement Class**

3 The Court is requested to designate Plaintiff Lorean Barrera as Class
4 Representative for the Settlement Class. As discussed above, Plaintiff will fairly and
5 adequately protect the interests of the Settlement Class.

6 Additionally, Rule 23(g)(1) requires the Court to appoint class counsel to
7 represent the interests of the Settlement Class. *See In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust*
8 *Litig.*, 232 F.R.D. 346, 355 (N.D. Cal. 2005). As set forth above, Bonnett, Fairbourn,
9 Friedman & Balint, P.C., Siprut, PC, Boodell & Domanskis, LLC, Levin Sedran &
10 Berman, and Westerman Law Corp. are experienced and well equipped to vigorously,
11 competently and efficiently represent the proposed Settlement Class. Accordingly, the
12 Court is requested to appoint Elaine A. Ryan (Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint,
13 P.C.), and Stewart M. Weltman (Siprut, PC), as Lead Settlement Class Counsel for the
14 Settlement Class and Boodell & Domanskis, LLC, Levin Sedran & Berman and
15 Westerman Law Corp. as Settlement Class Counsel.

16 **D. The Settlement Should Be Preliminarily Approved**

17 At the preliminary approval stage, the Court need only “make a preliminary
18 determination of the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement” so that
19 notice of the settlement may be given to the Settlement Class and a fairness hearing
20 may be scheduled to make a final determination regarding the fairness of the
21 settlement. *See* 4 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, *Newberg on Class Actions*,
22 §11.25 (4th ed. 2002); David F. Herr, *Annotated Manual for Complex Litigation*
23 (“*Manual*”) §21.632 (4th ed. 2008). In so doing, the Court reviews the settlement to
24 determine that it is not collusive and, “taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and
25 adequate to all concerned.” *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm.*, 688 F.2d 615,
26 625 (9th Cir. 1982); *see also Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Co.*, 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th
27 Cir. 2009).
28

1 Settlements of class actions are strongly favored. *Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle*, 955
2 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting “strong judicial policy that favors settlements,
3 particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned”); *see also Churchill*
4 *Village, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co.*, 361 F.3d 566, 576 (9th Cir. 2004); *In re Pacific Enter.*
5 *Sec. Litig.*, 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995). By their very nature, because of the
6 uncertainties of outcome, difficulties of proof, and lengthy duration, class actions
7 readily lend themselves to compromise. *Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp.*, 529 F.2d
8 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) (public interest in settling litigation is “particularly true in
9 class action suits...which frequently present serious problems of management and
10 expense”). Moreover, the Court may give a presumption of fairness to arm’s-length
11 settlements reached by experienced counsel with the assistance of a mediator.
12 *Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 965 (“We put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-
13 length, non-collusive, negotiated resolution.”). Rule 23(e) sets forth a “two-step
14 process in which the court first determines whether a proposed class action settlement
15 deserves preliminary approval and then, after notice is given to class members,
16 whether final approval is warranted.” *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop v. DIRECTV,*
17 *Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

18 On preliminary approval, the Court does not make a full and final determination
19 regarding fairness. “Because class members will subsequently receive notice and
20 have an opportunity to be heard,” the court “need not review the settlement in detail at
21 this juncture.” *In re M.L. Stern Overtime Litig.*, No. 07-CV-0118, 2009 WL 995864,
22 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009). “[I]nstead, preliminary approval is appropriate so
23 long as the proposed settlement falls ‘within the range of possible judicial approval.’”
24 *Id.* (quoting *Newberg on Class Actions*, §11.25 (4th ed. 2002)); *see also Manual for*
25 *Complex Litigation* (4th ed. 2009) §§ 21.632, 21.633. At this stage, the Court need
26 only conduct a *prima facie* review of the relief provided by the Settlement Agreement
27 to determine whether notice should be sent to the Settlement Class Members. *In re*
28 *M.L. Stern*, 2009 WL 995864, at *3.

1 The Court’s review is “limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned
2 judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or
3 collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is
4 fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625;
5 *accord Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027. This is a minimal threshold:

6 [I]f the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious,
7 informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does
8 not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or
9 segments of the class, and ***falls within the range of possible approval***,
then the court should direct that the notice be given to the Class members
of a formal fairness hearing

10 *Young v. Polo Retail, LLC*, No. C-02-4546, 2006 WL 3050861, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
11 25, 2006) (emphasis added and citations omitted).

12 The Ninth Circuit has articulated six factors to use in evaluating the fairness of
13 a class action settlement at the preliminary approval stage: (1) the strength of
14 plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
15 litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the
16 consideration offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed, and the
17 stage of the proceedings; and (6) the experience and views of counsel. *McCrary v.*
18 *Elations Co., LLC*, No. EDCV 13-0242 JGB (SPx), 2015 WL 12746707, at *4 (C.D.
19 Cal. Aug. 31, 2015); *Katz v. China Century Dragon Media, Inc.*, No. LA CV11-02769
20 JAK (SSx), 2013 WL 12138673, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2013).

21 Here, the proposed settlement satisfies the standard for preliminary approval on
22 the relevant parameters of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, placing it squarely
23 within the range of possible approval.

24 **1. The Strengths of Plaintiff’s Case and Risks Inherent in**
25 **Continued Litigation Favor Preliminary Approval**

26 Settlements resolve the inherent uncertainty on the merits, and are therefore
27 strongly favored by the courts, particularly in class actions. *See Van Bronkhorst*, 529
28 F.2d at 950; *United States v. McInnes*, 556 F.2d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 1977). This action

1 is not unique in this regard – the Parties and their respective experts disagree
2 diametrically about the merits, and there is substantial uncertainty about the ultimate
3 outcome of this litigation. While Plaintiff feels that her substantive claims are
4 meritorious, Pharmavite heavily contests the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, and there is
5 at least a possibility that a fact finder could find otherwise as to all or a part of
6 Plaintiff’s claims.

7 2. **The Risk, Complexity, Expense, and Duration of the**
8 **Litigation Favor Preliminary Approval**

9 In addition to the substantial risks and uncertainty inherent in continued
10 litigation, there is the certainty that further litigation would be expensive, complex,
11 and time consuming for the Parties. The Court would be required to resolve difficult
12 and complicated issues of statutory interpretation and state law raised by the currently
13 pending motions filed by both Parties.

14 Here, the proposed settlement specifically addresses the alleged deceptive
15 conduct by providing economic benefits to Settlement Class Members who submit
16 Valid Claims. The proposed settlement is able to provide these benefits without the
17 risk and delays of continued litigation, trial, and appeal. As important, the settlement
18 enjoins Pharmavite from making the following statements in the packaging of the
19 Covered Products to describe the effect of glucosamine and/or chondroitin on
20 cartilage: “rebuild”, “rebuilds”, “rebuilding”, “renew”, “renewing”, “renewal”,
21 “rejuvenate”, “rejuvenates”, “rejuvenation”, or “rejuvenating”. The expense,
22 complexity, and duration of litigation, including satisfying any judgment, are
23 significant factors considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement.
24 Litigating this class action through trial would undoubtedly be time-consuming and
25 expensive. As with most class actions, this action is complex. Indeed, to date, over
26 360,000 pages of documents have been produced, Plaintiff has retained three experts
27 and Pharmavite has retained seven experts, such that the trial of this action could
28 extend over several weeks. The expert evidence will be comprised of multiple

1 disciplines including epidemiology, medicine, rheumatology, microbiology,
2 economics, statistics, scientific methodology, marketing and accounting (among
3 others), and will likely involve reference to dozens (if not scores) of scientific
4 authorities and studies. The question of whether Pharmavite's products fulfill the
5 statements found on the labeling is vigorously disputed by the Parties. Thus, even if
6 successful at trial, post-trial motions and appeals would likely continue for years
7 before Plaintiff or the Settlement Class would see recovery, if any. That a settlement
8 would eliminate the delay and expenses strongly weighs in favor of approval. *See*
9 *Milstein v. Huck*, 600 F. Supp. 254, 267 (E.D.N.Y 1984).

10 By reaching this settlement, Plaintiff and the Settlement Class Members will
11 avoid protracted litigation and will establish a means for prompt resolution of the
12 claims of members of the Settlement Class and provide important labeling protections.
13 The avenue of relief provided by the settlement ensures meaningful benefits to the
14 Settlement Class and furthers important consumer protection goals through the
15 labeling changes. Given the alternative of long and complex litigation before this
16 Court, the risks involved in such litigation and the possibility of further appellate
17 litigation, the availability of prompt relief under the settlement is highly beneficial to
18 the Settlement Class.

19 **3. The Substantial Relief Provided by the Settlement Agreement**
20 **Favors Preliminary Approval**

21 The Settlement Agreement provides real relief for the Settlement Class.
22 Settlement Class Members who purchased the Covered Products may submit Claim
23 Forms and choose to receive cash compensation or free products. *See, e.g., In re*
24 *Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming final
25 approval of settlement in antitrust action providing class members the option of
26 receiving cash compensation or a gift card); *Shames v. Hertz Corp.*, 2012 WL
27 5392159 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012) (final approval of settlement providing class
28 members the option of receiving cash compensation or free car rental days).

1 Nevertheless, in evaluating the fairness of the consideration offered in settlement, it is
2 not the role of the court to second-guess the negotiated resolution of the parties.
3 “[T]he court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
4 negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to
5 reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
6 overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement,
7 taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Hanlon*, 150
8 F.3d at 1027 (quoting *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625); accord *Rodriguez*, 563
9 F.3d at 965. The issue is not whether the settlement could have been better in some
10 fashion, but whether it is fair: “Settlement is the offspring of compromise; the
11 question we address is not whether the final product could be prettier, smarter or
12 snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and free from collusion.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d
13 at 1027.

14
15 **4. The Stage of the Proceedings Favors Preliminary Approval;
Experience and Views of Counsel**

16 As for conducting relevant discovery, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s efforts were more
17 than sufficient. This litigation has been pending for almost six years. During this
18 time, the Parties have engaged in substantial formal and informal discovery necessary
19 to facilitate and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the case. Pharmavite has
20 produced over 360,000 pages of documents responsive to Plaintiff’s document
21 requests, tens of expert reports have been exchanged, competing motions for summary
22 judgment were filed and denied, and the case was on the eve of trial. As a result of
23 these efforts, Plaintiff’s Counsel was able to fully analyze the strengths and
24 weaknesses of the case.

25 Accordingly, the Parties (and the mediator, Magistrate Judge Gandhi) were able
26 to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions, including
27 the value of the potential damage claims, and to compare the benefits of the proposed
28 settlement to further litigation. Class Counsel, who have substantial experience in

1 litigating class actions, and the Court are therefore adequately informed to evaluate
2 the fairness of the proposed settlement.

3 5. **The Settlement Was Reached After An Arm’s Length**
4 **Mediation Session Conducted Before a Neutral Mediator, the**
5 **Honorable Jay C. Gandhi, Magistrate Judge, and Numerous**
6 **Follow up Sessions Conducted Under his Supervision and**
7 **With his Guidance.**

8 The Parties’ extensive arm’s-length settlement negotiations extended over ten
9 months, wherein the Parties’ counsel met in person as well as exchanged dozens of
10 emails, texts, and phone calls with Magistrate Judge Gandhi, and further participated
11 in an initial all-day mediation session with Magistrate Judge Gandhi, a highly-
12 regarded mediator. This course of settlement negotiations further demonstrates the
13 fairness of the settlement that was reached, and demonstrates that the settlement is not
14 a product of collusion. Typically, “[t]here is a presumption of fairness when a
15 proposed class settlement, which was negotiated at arm’s-length by counsel for the
16 class, is presented for Court approval.” *Newberg on Class Actions*, §11.41; *see also*
17 *White v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc.*, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2011).

18 Here, counsel for Pharmavite and Plaintiff each zealously negotiated on behalf
19 of their clients’ best interests. From the beginning of the negotiations until the end,
20 the parties engaged with Hon. Jay C. Gandhi, Magistrate Judge, an experienced and
21 skilled mediator, who assisted the Parties to arrive at a settlement after ten months.
22 Fees and expenses were not negotiated until the substantive provisions of monetary,
23 free product, and injunctive relief were finalized. At the inception of the settlement
24 discussions, Plaintiff’s Counsel, who are experienced in prosecuting complex class
25 action claims, had “a clear view of the strengths and weaknesses” of their case and
26 were in a position to make an informed decision regarding the reasonableness of a
27 potential settlement. *In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig.*, 618 F. Supp. 735, 745
28 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *see also Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc.*, 266 F.R.D. 482,
489-90 (E.D. Cal. 2010). After having reached a settlement with the assistance of
Magistrate Judge Gandhi, the Parties began the painstaking process of negotiating the

1 language of the Settlement Agreement and its many details. The Parties negotiated on
2 each and every detail of the Settlement Agreement and its exhibits, comprising 85
3 pages. The fact that a highly regarded and experienced mediator was heavily involved
4 in the settlement negotiations is one factor that demonstrates the settlement was
5 anything but collusive. *See, e.g., Chun-Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp.*, 716 F. Supp. 2d
6 848, 852 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The arms-length negotiations, including a day-long
7 mediation before Judge Lynch, indicate that the settlement was reached in a
8 procedurally sound manner.”); *In re M.L. Stern*, 2009 WL 995864, at *5 (granting
9 preliminary approval and stating that “the settlement was reached with the supervision
10 and assistance of an experienced and well-respected independent mediator”).

11 The proposed settlement is fair to all members of the Settlement Class because
12 it provides them with the option of monetary or free product relief after submitting
13 online (or by mail) a simplified claim form that requires nothing else. Furthermore,
14 the injunctive relief related to labeling is also an additional component of this
15 settlement. Pharmavite has agreed to not use the following terms or any substantially
16 identical variation of the proscribed terms on product labels to describe the effect of
17 glucosamine and/or chondroitin on cartilage: “rebuild”, “rebuilds”, “rebuilding”,
18 “renew”, “renewing”, “renewal”, “rejuvenate”, “rejuvenates”, “rejuvenation”, or
19 “rejuvenating”. Further, Plaintiff does not receive any unduly preferential treatment
20 under the settlement. With the exception of an award of around \$1,700/year for her
21 six years of service as a class representative – \$10,000 to account for her willingness
22 to step forward and represent other consumers and to compensate her for her time and
23 effort devoted to prosecuting the common claims over six years – Plaintiff is treated
24 the same as every other Settlement Class Member. Such service awards are “fairly
25 typical in class actions.” *Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 958; *see also In re Simon v. Toshiba*
26 *America*, No. C 07-06202, 2010 WL 1757956, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2010);
27 *Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, No. 02cv2003, 2010 WL 761122, at *3 (S.D.
28 Cal. Mar. 4, 2010) (“Although [plaintiff] seeks a \$5,000 service fee for himself which

1 is not available to other class members, the fee appears to be reasonable in light of
2 [plaintiff’s] efforts on behalf of the class members.”); *In re M.L. Stern Overtime Litig.*,
3 No. 07-cv-0118, 2009 WL 3272872, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2009) (granting final
4 approval and awarding class representative class enhancement awards of \$15,000 per
5 class representative).

6 Beyond the substantial involvement and assistance of a highly-qualified
7 mediator, the experience of Class Counsel⁷ and Pharmavite’s Counsel as longstanding
8 class action attorneys, and the fair result reached confirm that the negotiations that led
9 to the settlement were arm’s length, not collusive. *See also* Newberg, at §11.41 (The
10 initial presumption of fairness of a class settlement may be established by showing:
11 (1) that the settlement has been arrived at by arm’s length bargaining; (2) that
12 sufficient discovery has been taken or investigation completed to enable counsel and
13 the court to act intelligently; and (3) that the proponents of the settlement are counsel
14 experienced in similar litigation.).

15 Accordingly, the settlement is well within the “range of possible approval” and
16 should thus be preliminarily approved. The central issue facing the Court at this stage
17 is whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of what ultimately might be
18 approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate, so as to justify providing notice to the
19 Class and scheduling a final approval hearing. The Court is not required at this
20 juncture to make a final determination that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
21 adequate, nor will any Class members’ substantive rights be prejudiced by preliminary
22 approval. “If the preliminary evaluation of the proposed settlement does not disclose
23 grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious deficiencies ... and appears to fall
24 within the range of possible approval,” the Court should grant preliminary approval
25

26
27 ⁷ Counsel for Plaintiff are experienced complex class action and consumer fraud
28 litigation firms, as demonstrated in the firm biographies of Class Counsel attached as
Ex. 4.

1 and direct notice and schedule a final approval hearing. *Manual for Complex*
2 *Litigation*, Third § 30.41, at 237 (1995).⁸

3 Here, the Settlement Agreement strikes a compromise that affords fair
4 recompense to Settlement Class Members who submit a claim, and meaningful
5 injunctive relief to all Settlement Class Members—even those who submit no claim.
6 The proposed settlement provides for consumers who elect cash compensation and
7 who have some form of proof of purchase to obtain compensation for approximately
8 100% of the average retail purchase price for up to four (4) purchases and consumers
9 who have no such documentation to obtain compensation for approximately 50% of
10 the average retail purchase price for up to four (4) purchases.⁹ Settlement Class
11 Members who elect free product may obtain 100% of their average purchase price in
12 free product for up to six (6) purchases. The notice plan, involving the payment by
13 Pharmavite of up to \$325,000 for notice and administration costs, has an anticipated
14 reach of close to 75% of the Settlement Class Members. *See generally*, Rosenthal
15 Decl., Ex. 1-F hereto. If the number of valid claims received exceeds 40,000, the
16 administration costs will be scaled up on a per claim basis. Any scaled up
17 administration costs shall be paid by Pharmavite, with the first \$25,000 of any scaled-
18 up administration expense at Pharmavite’s sole expense and any scaled-up expense in

19 _____
20 ⁸ The *Manual For Complex Litigation* sets forth the procedures for preliminary
approval of settlements:

21 If the preliminary evaluation of the proposed settlement does not disclose
22 grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious deficiencies, such as
23 unduly preferential treatment of class representatives or of segments of
24 the class, or excessive compensation for attorneys, and appears to fall
25 within the range of possible approval, the court should direct that notice
under Rule 23(e) be given to the class members of a formal fairness
hearing, at which arguments and evidence may be presented in support
of and in opposition to the settlement.

26 *Manual*, § 21.632.

27 ⁹ The Covered Products range in price from approximately \$15.00 to \$40.00. (Second
28 Amended Complaint, ¶ 10.)

1 excess of \$25,000 also to be paid by Pharmavite but reducing the \$5.9 million product
2 benefit by an equal amount.

3 Furthermore, the settlement provides for meaningful injunctive relief in the
4 form of labeling prohibitions for dozens of different products.

5 Moreover, the labeling relief will provide an important consumer benefit both
6 for members of the Settlement Class in connection with any future purchases they
7 may make and future new purchasers. Since consumer protection is the touchstone of
8 all consumer fraud laws (*see, e.g., Asghari v. Volkswagen Grp. Of Am., Inc.*, 42 F.
9 Supp. 3d 1306, 1314 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“The CLRA is to be ‘liberally construed and
10 applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against
11 unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical
12 procedures to secure such protection.”) (citations omitted); *Kwikset Corp.*, 51 Cal.
13 4th at 344 (California’s UCL’s “purpose ‘is to protect both consumers and competitors
14 by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services’” and
15 “[i]n service of that purpose, the Legislature framed the UCL’s substantive provisions
16 in “‘broad, sweeping language’” (citations omitted)), the injunctive relief provided in
17 the Settlement Agreement is a significant and meaningful part of this settlement.

18 There is an initial presumption of fairness because the settlement is the product
19 of arm’s length negotiations conducted by experienced counsel who are fully familiar
20 with all aspects of class action litigation. *In re General Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel*
21 *Tank Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 516 U.S. 824 (1995)
22 (“This preliminary determination establishes an initial presumption of fairness when
23 the court finds that: (1) the negotiations occurred at arm’s length.... [and] (3) the
24 proponents of the settlement are experienced in similar litigation. . . .”); *see also*
25 *Newberg on Class Actions* § 11.4; *Manual for Complex Litigation* (Third) § 30.42
26 (1995); *In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig.*, 275 F.R.D. 654, 662 (N.D. Fla.
27 2011).

28

1 Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed
2 settlement “falls within the range of what ultimately might be approved as fair,
3 reasonable, and adequate” and that preliminary approval should be granted.

4 **E. The Notice Plan**

5 The threshold requirement concerning class notice is whether the means
6 employed to distribute the notice was reasonably calculated to apprise the Class of the
7 pendency of the action, of the proposed settlement and of the Settlement Class
8 Members’ rights to opt out or object. *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156,
9 173 (1974); *Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
10 The mechanics of the notice process are left to the discretion of the Court, subject only
11 to the broad “reasonableness” standards imposed by due process. In this Circuit, it has
12 long been the case that a notice of settlement will be adjudged “satisfactory if it
13 ‘generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with
14 adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.’” *Rodriguez*,
15 563 F.3d at 962 (quoting *Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Electric*, 361 F.3d 566,
16 575 (9th Cir. 2004)); *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1025 (notice should provide each absent
17 class member with the opportunity to opt-out and individually pursue any remedies
18 that might provide a better opportunity for recovery). The notice should also present
19 information “neutrally, simply, and understandably,” including “describ[ing] the
20 aggregate amount of the settlement fund and the plan for allocation.” *Rodriguez*, 563
21 F.3d at 962.

22 The notice here is fully compliant with due process in that it informs the
23 Settlement Class Members of their right to opt-out or exclude themselves from the
24 settlement, appear through their own counsel, object to the terms of the settlement
25 along with the form that the objection must take, the deadlines for opt-out/exclusion or
26 objection, the date of the final approval hearing, the scope of the claims released if a
27 Settlement Class Member does not opt-out and remains in the Settlement Class, and
28 the potential amounts of Plaintiff’s incentive award and Settlement Class Counsels’

1 attorneys' fee award. *See* Ex. 1-F, Rosenthal Decl. at Ex. 1. KCC Class Action
2 Services, LLC (“KCC”)¹⁰ has been identified as the third-party Settlement
3 Administrator. *Id.* The notice plan was based upon an analysis by Daniel Rosenthal,
4 Special Consultant to KCC, who has more than 30 years of class action notice and
5 administration experience. Rosenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4. Based upon Mr. Rosenthal’s
6 analysis of publications likely to reach the proposed Settlement Class, one print
7 publication in two national publications (Arthritis Today and People) were chosen. *Id.*
8 at ¶¶ 11-12. Further, to fulfill the notice requirements set forth in California’s
9 Consumer Legal Remedies Act, notice will also be published once a week for four
10 consecutive weeks in the *LA Daily News*. *Id.* at ¶14. And, KCC will cause
11 approximately 130 million internet impressions targeting adults aged 35+ to be
12 distributed over a variety of websites. Rosenthal Decl. at ¶ 13. Of those 130 million
13 internet impressions, 120 million impressions will target adults 35+ at a 1x frequency
14 gap; 5 million impressions will target adults 35+ who have shown an interest in health
15 as well as those who have searched for the keywords “joint pain” and “glucosamine”;
16 and 5 million impressions will target adults Facebook users aged 35+ who are
17 categorized as anticipated purchasers of vitamins, pain relief, or health and wellness
18 products. *Id.* at Ex. 1.

19 In *In re Toys R US – Delaware, Inc. – Fair & Accurate Credit Trans. Act*
20 (*FACTA*) *Litig.*, 295 F. R.D. 438, 449 (C.D. Cal. 2014), the Court approved a
21 publication notice for a nationwide class that consisted of publication in one
22 publication of national circulation and the posting of the notice on a website set up by
23 a settlement administrator. *See also In re Tableware Antitrust Litig.*, 484 F. Supp. 2d
24 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving notice plan consisting of publication in USA
25 Today, on the settlement website, and a popular website related to wedding planning).

26 Here, the notice plan meets these threshold requirements.

27 _____
28 ¹⁰ <http://www.kcellc.com>.

1 **V. CONCLUSION**

2 Based upon the foregoing, and because the proposed settlement is fair,
3 reasonable, and sufficient to warrant that the notice plan be approved and a final
4 approval hearing be held, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter the
5 preliminary approval order that accompanies this motion and memorandum, as Ex. 1-
6 C.

7
8 DATED: April 28, 2017

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 28, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the e-mail addresses denoted on the Electronic mail notice list. I hereby certify that I have mailed the foregoing document via the United States Postal Service to the non-CM/ECF participants indicated on the Manual Notice List.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 28, 2017.

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